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Abstract 
How does the relationship between founding team composition and venture performance depend 
on the venture’s strategy and business environment? Using data from a novel survey of 2,067 
firms, we show that while diverse founding teams tend to exhibit higher performance, this is not 
universally true. We find that founding teams that are diverse are likely to achieve high 
performance in a competitive commercialization environment. On the other hand, technically-
focused founding teams are aligned with a cooperative commercialization environment and when 
the enterprise pursues an innovation strategy. These results are robust to corrections for 
endogenous team formation concerns. The findings suggest that ventures cannot ignore founding 
team composition and expect to later professionalize their top management teams to align with 
their strategy and environment. 
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Introduction 
Founding teams of new ventures are typically composed of individuals with demographic 
characteristics much more alike than different as compared to a benchmark of randomly 
assembled teams (Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter, 2003). However, we have little knowledge of 
whether, or under what circumstances, founding team uniformity helps or hinders venture 
performance. Restated, we do not know when founders ought to include more diversity on their 
founding teams. Building on the upper echelon theory of organizations relating characteristics of 
the top management team (TMT) to organizational performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), 
existing studies of founding team composition generally suggest that diverse teams allow 
ventures to access a broader array of skills while more uniform teams tend to speed execution 
and implementation (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Beckman, 2006). However, because 
the benefits to one type of founding team composition are likely to be more important under 
certain circumstances, we may suspect that one type of team composition is not unconditionally 
better than another.  
We examine the impact of founding team composition on firm performance under two 
contingencies often important to new ventures: the business environment and strategy.1 While 
the early contingency literature related organizational design decisions to features of the business 
environment such as stability versus turbulence (Burns and Stalker, 1961), such organizational 
design decisions did not include founding team composition. However, as founding teams are the 
first TMT of the enterprise, team composition impacts both current skills and, as a result of 
founder imprinting, has a variety of long-lived effects on organizational performance (Boeker, 
1989; Baron, Burton, and Hannan, 1999; Beckman and Burton, 2007). We therefore believe that 
                                                
1 We use the terms business environment and strategy to refer to general concepts in the literature. When we discuss 
our hypothesis development and empirical operationalization, we use the terms commercialization environment and 
innovation strategy. 
 3 
the business environment is an important yet understudied contingency to the relationship 
between founding team composition and performance. Similarly, strategy has long been thought 
of as how the top management team intends to position itself and interact with the business 
environment (Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin, 2012). While the early literature discussed “fit” 
between different corporate strategies and varying organizational designs and investments (Miles 
and Snow, 1981; Maidique and Patch, 1982), only later did scholars examine how top 
management characteristics might align with strategies in shaping organizational performance 
(Thomas, Litschert, and Ramaswamy, 1991; McGee, Dowling, and Megginson, 1995). However, 
the critical role of founding team composition and the associated founder imprinting effects are 
not considered in this literature.  
We examine features of firms’ business environment that extend beyond the dimension of 
environmental stability versus turbulence and build on the early insight in the contingency 
literature that technical requirements are an important feature of the business environment that 
can impact organizational design (Woodward, 1965). In business environments in which new 
ventures enjoy strong appropriability for their innovations, such as through intellectual property 
protection, they will more readily engage in negotiations with partners for cooperative 
commercialization (as striking deal terms must involve innovation disclosure). Furthermore, 
should commercializing the innovation in a given industry also require assembling downstream 
complementary assets, such as a specialized sales force that the potential partner might possess, 
this reinforces the degree to which the environment favors a cooperative strategy (Teece, 1986; 
Gans and Stern, 2003). In contrast, a competitive environment is characterized by weak 
appropriability (so the entrepreneur is reluctant to bargain with and disclose innovation details to 
potential partners) and relatively low cost of assembling the requisite complementary assets (thus 
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lowering the entrepreneur’s costs of product market entry). Using an upper echelon lens on 
information and skills, we argue that the ideal founding team composition depends on whether 
the enterprise operates in a cooperative or competitive environment.   
A second contingency we examine in the link between founding team composition and 
enterprise performance is the venture’s innovation strategy. When considering the competitive 
strategies available to entrepreneurs, an important choice is whether or not to pursue an 
innovator strategy (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Hellmann and Puri, 2000). Innovator strategies are marked by an opportunity-driven logic in 
which a certain degree of risk (often technological) is accepted in order to attain growth. Since 
firms have the choice of whether to pursue an innovator strategy, a natural question is whether 
this choice also has implications for the ideal founding team composition, as the team 
composition will impact the venture’s information and skills.  
We therefore seek to address a missing perspective in the upper echelon literature as it 
applies to new ventures: The notion of aligning founding team composition with the business 
environment and strategy to enhance organizational performance. At a broad level, we believe 
this gap in the literature is an important one because the performance of entrepreneurial firms is a 
significant engine in driving economic growth and job creation (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda, 2010; Roberts and Eesley, 2011). Furthermore, the founder imprinting literature 
suggests that the ability to add managerial expertise over the venture lifecycle may be limited 
(Beckman 2006; Beckman and Burton, 2008), implying that the stakes to founder composition 
decisions are magnified. 
We use unique data on the founding management roles played at venture inception in 
2,067 ventures started by alumni of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to shed 
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light on founding team composition alignment with the organization’s strategy and business 
environment. We examine three sets of variables: founding team composition (the diversity and 
technical focus of the founding team) and its alignment with two sets of contingent variables (1) 
whether the industry commercialization environment is competitive or cooperative, and (2) the 
firm’s degree of innovation strategy. We measure performance in a way consistent with the 
literature, i.e., whether the enterprise and its equity-holders achieve liquidity via an “exit” event 
such as an acquisition or IPO. 
We find that founding teams that are diverse are likely to achieve high performance in a 
competitive commercialization environment. On the other hand, technically-focused founding 
teams are aligned with a cooperative commercialization environment and when the enterprise 
pursues an innovation strategy. Our study therefore demonstrates the contingent relationship 
between founding team composition and organizational performance depending on business 
environment and strategy. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we discuss our motivation for examining founding teams and review the 
literature on teams and organizational performance. We then turn our attention to theorizing 
about aligning founding team composition with two sets of factors that are likely to exhibit 
important contingencies - innovation strategies and commercialization environments. As we 
describe in greater detail below, these contingencies are likely to play particularly important and 
previously unexamined roles in shaping the necessary founding team characteristics for success. 
Founding team composition. Upper echelon theory argues that top management team 
(TMT) characteristics shape organizational performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 
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1983; Beckman and Burton, 2008), where a TMT member is any manager who occupies an 
executive-level position. While this literature has a long tradition regarding TMTs of established 
firms, far fewer studies have examined the link between founding teams and performance.  
Founding teams are often the first TMT of an organization, and so we might initially 
expect the range of findings on TMTs to apply equally well to founding teams. We might more 
specifically expect this to hold under a pure “lifecycle” view of entrepreneurial TMT succession, 
in which founders are replaced with new managers possessing skills appropriate for the given life 
stage of a venture (Greiner, 1972), with little or no organizational memory and adjustment costs 
of organizational procedures and culture. The argument is that organizations encounter different 
challenges at various stages in the “lifecycle” of the organization and therefore different top 
managers with new skills should be brought in (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Quinn and 
Cameron, 1983; Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Others have argued along similar lines that the 
departure of founders and hiring of “new blood” is necessary with certain transitions in the life of 
the entrepreneurial firm (Miller, 1993; Miller and Shamsie, 2001).  
However, a long literature suggests that both environmental and founder imprinting can 
have long-lived effects on organizational processes, structure, and outcomes, even long after a 
founding team departs a venture (Stinchcombe, 1965; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Baron, et al., 1999; Beckman and Burton, 2008). The imprinting view relies on a path 
dependency mechanism in which the early decisions about founding team composition shape 
future behavior, organizational structure, and as a result, firm performance. These early choices 
are not easily undone, and so it becomes consequential whether the early team is well-aligned 
with strategic decisions and with the industry environment. Such path dependency can result 
from many sources, including organizational routines that can guide behavior and that may 
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transcend particular individuals, to developed organizational reputations that can influence the 
type and quality of individuals attracted to work at a given firm. The high-level consequence for 
our purposes is that founding team composition and their decisions regarding business policy and 
organizational structure can be consequential even decades after founding the firm (Boeker, 
1989; Miles and Snow, 1978).  
Within the founding team literature, a main set of findings is that more homogenous 
founding teams may have advantages in faster decision-making and execution (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), while diverse teams tend to have a broader 
set of skills and draw on a wider variety of information and experiences (Beckman, 2006; 
Beckman and Haunschild, 2002). Teams with a diversity of knowledge and skills who at the 
same time are able to execute quickly and efficiently are in an even more privileged position 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Beckman, 2008). This team configuration might be 
possible because teams could have diversity in their functional backgrounds, but have uniformity 
by having a common employer, for example. Despite these findings on founding team 
configuration, Ruef, et al. (2003) find that the composition of actual founding teams is much 
more uniform than would be expected relative to random pairings of founders.  
At a broad level, these findings on founding teams largely echo the results from a large 
body of literature relating the demographic composition of TMTs to firm strategy and 
performance (for comprehensive reviews, see Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Williams and 
O’Reilly, 1998). Many studies demonstrate a positive relationship between top management 
functional diversity and firm outcomes (Lant and Mezias, 1992). Diversity is thought to improve 
firm performance because it ensures that the TMT has a broader spectrum of experience and 
capabilities (Keck, 1997; Randel and Jaussi, 2003).  
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A related yet distinct dimension of team composition is the degree to which founding 
teams adopt a technical focus, with the associated human resource management implications 
(Baron, et al., 1999). For instance, a team composed solely of engineers or scientists with chief 
technology officer or vice president of engineering roles would be highly technically-focused. 
We chose to examine technical focus rather than other dimensions (finance, operations, or 
marketing) because the prior literature has suggested that many firms, particularly those that are 
technology-based, begin with a technical founding team and then subsequently “professionalize” 
by adding other functions to the top management team. Technically-focused teams are also the 
most relevant to our focus on innovation strategy and commercialization environments. 
Unlike the founding team literature, the upper echelons literature on large, established 
firms has demonstrated certain contingencies shaping the optimal TMT composition. These 
studies largely show that the more complex the environment or strategy, the more that diversity 
among top executives is beneficial (Priem, 1990; Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996; Carpenter, 
2002). For instance, a firm’s corporate diversification posture (Michel and Hambrick, 1992) and 
environmental turbulence (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993) skew the ideal TMT composition 
towards diversity. Furthermore, functionally diverse teams are more likely to survive disruptions 
in the environment (Keck and Tushman, 1993). Yet, within the literature on early TMTs, few 
papers discuss team demography contingencies or the importance of fit between the founding 
team and business strategy and the business environment.2  
In summary, while scholars have noted that many founding teams are more focused and 
homogenous than diverse, we have little knowledge of when such founding team composition 
might be misaligned with innovation strategy or the business environment. We seek to begin 
                                                
2 For example, Amason, et al. (2006) use a sample of 174 firms experiencing an IPO to argue that highly diverse 
TMTs have lower performance when the venture had more novel products and services.  
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gaining that understanding in this study by paying particular attention to the founding team, 
especially in light of the early team imprinting across a range of organizational processes. By 
doing so, we respond to Hambrick’s (2007) call to examine the role of the founding team in 
greater depth. A recent meta-analysis on the relationship between TMT composition and firm 
financial performance suggests a middling direct relationship, but calls for work on moderating 
influences shaping the relationship between team composition and organizational performance 
more generally (Certo, et al., 2006). 
Innovator strategy. A firm’s strategy to be an innovator may impact the link between 
founding team composition and venture performance. When considering the competitive 
strategies available to entrepreneurs, an important choice is whether or not to pursue an 
innovator strategy (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Hellmann and Puri, 2000). While it is not clear that an innovator strategy is always better than 
other alternatives (Leiberman and Montgomery, 1998), the choice has implications for the skills 
needed, which in turn directly relate to issues of founding team composition. A non-innovation 
based firm tends to compete on dimensions other than technological innovation since it is not 
developing new-to-the-world products. Innovators introduce new products and services and 
primarily compete based on their technical edge. Since firms have the choice of whether to 
pursue an innovator strategy, a natural question is whether this choice also has implications for 
the ideal founding team composition.  
As compared to firms pursuing an innovator strategy, which rely more on the single 
dimension of technical excellence for success, ventures not pursuing an innovation strategy will 
rely on a broader set of resources and skills for success. As a result, in most firms outside of that 
select group pursuing an innovator strategy, having a more functionally diverse founding team 
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offers a performance advantage. Consistent with prior literature, most such firms will have to be 
competent in a wide range of areas such as sales and marketing, product distribution, and cost 
leadership. While Teece (1986) stresses that possessing such complementary organizational 
assets and skills (distinct from the raw technical invention) is important for value capture in 
general, these assets will be particularly important in settings in which the basis for value capture 
is broader, such as in the majority of cases when firms do not pursue an innovator strategy. 
Firms engaged in a less innovation-intensive strategy are therefore more vulnerable to 
their weakest organizational link. This argument is reminiscent of Lazear’s (2004) image of 
entrepreneurs as jack-of-all-trades. Because entrepreneurial team success hinges on possessing 
sufficient skill in each of a variety of domains, teams with a balanced but lower set of 
multifaceted skills are likely to outperform teams with leading edge skills in certain domains but 
with low or missing competence in other domains.  
Furthermore, under a less innovation-intensive strategy, firms may have to engage in a 
more complex strategy such as orchestrating linkages among a broader set of organizational 
activities (the span of which may be less diffuse for firms pursuing an innovation-oriented 
strategy). Diverse founding teams may be more capable of building or accessing the requisite 
complementary organizational assets, as well as the management skills necessary to manage the 
complexity. In turn, engaging and managing the wider set of organizational resources can raise 
the barriers to entry and imitation by others (Rivkin, 2000) and provide a basis for competitive 
advantage. Indeed, the TMT literature has found that team diversity is more beneficial with 
complexity (Hambrick et al., 1996; Priem, 1990).  
It is also important to consider the source of complexity in a venture and whether it 
comes from the technology or the business model aspects of the firm. In addition to Hambrick et 
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al.’s (1996) conceptualization of environmental complexity, complexity may also affect the 
technical and/or business aspects of the venture. The specific source of complexity in the 
venture’s strategy should be aligned with the team composition (technical focus or functional 
diversity). In ventures that are using an innovator strategy, the complexity is likely to reside in 
the technology aspect of the business. For instance, a cure for cancer is very complex technically 
(requiring multiple scientists and engineers with various backgrounds), but the business model if 
such a cure were discovered is relatively more straightforward. In contrast, in ventures pursuing 
a non-innovator strategy, the technical aspects are likely to be less complex and the greater 
source of complexity is then more likely to stem from the business model aspect of the firm, 
requiring greater diversity in functional roles, such as marketing, sales, and distribution. Thus, 
complexity of either type could result in diversity being beneficial to performance. However, 
complexity in the technical aspects as a result of an innovator strategy can be better addressed 
via technically-focused team members, and thus other more diverse functional roles will be 
likely to contribute less in this case. 
In sum, consistent with prior literature, we expect diverse founding teams will be 
positively associated with venture performance. However, firms pursuing an innovator strategy 
will be an exception and will not experience the same positive impact from a diverse founding 
team. Outside of those firms pursuing an innovator strategy, multifaceted organizational skills, 
resources and management are particularly important for value creation and capture, and diverse 
founding teams are more likely to possess such attributes. We therefore predict that while diverse 
teams have a positive performance effect, this will not be the case in all situations: 
H1a: Diverse founding teams are positively associated with venture performance, but are less 
beneficial when pursuing an innovator strategy.  
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For firms pursuing an innovation strategy, on the other hand, a more technically-focused 
founding team may improve venture performance.3 A technically-focused founding team is more 
likely to achieve the technological milestones necessary to develop the invention (Boeker, 1989). 
This can stem from a variety of mechanisms including enhanced managerial focus on technical 
development, stronger links with the relevant labor market (which can facilitate identifying, 
recruiting and retaining technical staff), and/or fewer frictions in executing a product 
development plan due to improved communication between management and technical staff.  
In turn, venture capitalists (VCs) are disproportionately attracted to funding new 
enterprises pursuing an innovation strategy (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). VCs can help provide a 
range of services such as business development, strategic advice, corporate governance and 
professionalization services, all of which can help entrepreneurs speed their products to market 
(e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Hsu, 2006). Such services may help partially overcome the 
broader challenge faced by initially narrowly-focused founding teams in subsequently building 
broader TMTs (Beckman and Burton, 2008).  
Of course not all new ventures will attract or wish to accept venture capital funding, and 
for these firms, pursuing an innovation strategy with technically-focused teams can attract 
incumbent firm partners to perform complementary commercialization functions such as sales 
and marketing activities. Being at the leading edge of innovation in a given category can offer a 
compelling value proposition to would-be partners to the focal firm and lead to more 
commercialization opportunities.  
On the other hand, the predictions of the lifecycle perspective on organizations and top 
management teams would be that founding teams that are initially technically-focused (or 
                                                
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that our thesis that founding team technical expertise can be 
important for an innovation strategy is not the same as the argument that team diversity can be problematic, as those 
attributes are not mutually exclusive within a team, as prior studies show. 
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functionally diverse) can hire top managers as they encounter new life cycle stages and new 
challenges. This view would suggest that the composition of the initial founding team has limited 
explanatory power as the firm can later hire managers aligned with its strategy and environment. 
Nonetheless, for a number of additional reasons that the lifecycle view does not consider, 
technically-focused teams are also likely to have an advantage when innovating. Such teams 
have better knowledge and expertise regarding what innovations have been tried previously and 
either failed or succeeded, and so have a better technical roadmap for product development. They 
are also likely to have more connections to the external technical community, which can be 
helpful for providing information, building technical advisory boards and overcoming technical 
challenges. Finally, technically-focused teams are also likely to share heuristics and mental 
models allowing for faster decision-making, better coordination and a smoother working 
relationship among cofounders. We therefore expect: 
H1b Technically focused founding teams, when they pursue an innovation strategy, are 
positively associated with venture performance. 
 
Commercialization environment. Strategy and organization theorists have long been 
interested in the influence of the firm’s environment (Porter, 1991; Selznick, 1949; Starbuck, 
1983; Stinchcombe, 1965). Prior work has shown that organizations are influenced by the 
opportunities provided by environmental jolts and turbulence (Grant, 2003), the industry life 
cycle’s effect on innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978), and the isomorphic pressures of 
the institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008). Organizational ecologists 
have focused on the roles of density, legitimacy and resource munificence on firm survival 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Others have explored the strategic decision-making implications 
of high velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1989) and managing environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Finally, the stakeholder and social movement literature have 
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demonstrated the role of activists and social movement organizations (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; 
Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009). We focus on the line of work examining how certain technical 
dimensions of the industry environment can shape organizational design (Woodward, 1965).  
Prior literature indicates that for several reasons, including technical requirements in 
some industries, firms typically undertake a strategic approach and partner with as opposed to 
compete against industry incumbents (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Christensen and Bower, 1996; 
Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). This literature contains a theoretically-based way to classify 
industry commercialization environments since it gives us a structured lens through which to 
predict how new ventures will likely make strategic choices and what types of teams they may 
need. For instance, in the biotechnology industry, ventures frequently develop a new technology 
and then partner with incumbents (pharmaceutical firms) who handle the subsequent steps of 
regulatory approval, marketing, sales and distribution. In contrast, in some industries such as 
software it is more common for ventures to compete head-to-head in the product market with 
incumbent firms. These commercialization environments, which we label competitive versus 
cooperative with incumbents, tend to differ across industries (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). A key 
insight from this literature is that certain dimensions of industry environments, such as the 
importance of complementary assets and the effectiveness of intellectual property protection, 
especially relate to the technical requirements of the industry (Woodward, 1965; Tripsas, 1997). 
These shape the likelihood that a venture will pursue a competitive versus cooperative strategy 
with industry incumbents for commercializing their products or services (Gans and Stern, 2003; 
Lerner and Merges, 1998; Rothaermel, 2001).  
In the cooperative environment, ventures tend to cooperate with incumbents and form 
partnerships with established firms in the industry to bring their products and services to market. 
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Ventures in cooperative environments tend not to compete in the product market directly with 
incumbents; instead they typically partner with industry incumbents. This type of cooperative 
commercialization environment characterizes industries like biotechnology (that often partner 
with incumbent pharmaceutical firms for regulatory approval, marketing and distribution) and 
medical devices, telecommunications, or chemicals. In a competitive commercialization 
environment (for instance, software, consumer products, or web services), ventures seek to 
compete in the product market against incumbent firms rather than partner for commercialization 
(e.g., Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2008; Tripsas, 1997). 
These differences in the technical requirements of the industry environment have direct 
implications for the founding team composition. When in a competitive environment, 
entrepreneurial ventures typically have to make investments in their own complementary assets, 
such as marketing, sales, manufacturing and distribution to build the capabilities necessary to 
compete in the market. More functionally diverse founding teams have the human capital, skills, 
and diversity of experience to build the complementary assets necessary to commercialize a 
good. It is more challenging for a technically-focused team of all engineers or scientists to build 
the sales, marketing and distribution capabilities necessary for the firm to compete with industry 
incumbents. Consequently, we predict: 
H2a: When in a competitive commercialization environment, diverse founding teams are 
positively associated with venture performance.   
 
In contrast, a cooperative commercialization environment tends to favor ventures which 
partner with industry incumbents to bring their products and services to market. In these settings, 
a firm can exclude others from using its technology either by secrecy or because patent 
protection is more effective in these industries (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000), thus 
mitigating the expropriation threat inherent in contracting with a partner. In addition, 
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complementary assets owned by incumbents are important for commercialization and difficult 
for a new venture to replicate (Rothaermel, 2001; Tripsas, 1997), further enhancing the 
incentives for joint commercialization. As a result, a cooperative commercialization environment 
(such as in the biotechnology industry) may be aligned with a different type of founding team 
composition as compared with a competitive environment. In cooperative commercialization 
environments, ventures compete with one another to partner with industry incumbents. 
Cooperative environments are therefore marked by tight appropriability regimes and innovations 
are necessary that sustain existing complementary assets owned by incumbents.  
In cooperative environments, competition exists among entrepreneurial firms in 
supplying innovations to larger firms, making a focus on technology and technical talent more 
important. Furthermore, startup innovators have the option to license or sell their innovation to 
the incumbent rather than bear the full cost of developing complementary assets. In the case of 
the mobile telecommunications market, for example, where a strong startup cooperative 
environment exists, new entrants did better when pursuing next generation technological 
innovation (He, Lim, and Wong, 2006). When in a cooperative commercialization environment, 
a venture that is partnering can rely on an incumbent firm’s capabilities in marketing, sales, and 
customer support, allowing it to have a more focused set of skills on the founding team.  
Technical milestones such as completion of design, proof-of-concept, prototype 
completion and pilot production indicate a new firm’s development stage (Sahlman, 1990), and a 
technically-focused team can more quickly progress through technical stages of development 
(Katila, Rosenberger, Eisenhardt, 2008). Such development can help the startup innovator more 
successfully gather financial resources (Hallen, 2008) and enable the firm to give up less equity 
when raising financial capital (Gompers, 1995). Getting the pilot completed and beginning initial 
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sales can also help the firm gain more direct feedback from the market. If customer feedback 
signals that a new set of features is needed, then such a team may more easily re-engineer the 
product to new specifications. Furthermore, completing more of the technical development 
enables a firm to be in a better negotiating position, allowing it to capture more value (Katila, et 
al., 2008). As a result, we expect that a technically-focused founding team will be more 
beneficial for firms in a cooperative commercialization environment: 
H2b: When in a cooperative commercialization environment, technology-focused founding 
teams are positively associated with venture performance. 
 
 
Data and Measures 
 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of 2,067 ventures founded between 1931 and 
2003. We developed this sample from a novel survey administered in 2001 to all 105,928 alumni 
from MIT to generate a sample of firms where we have detailed information on founders as well 
as on firm performance. An alumni survey is particularly appropriate because it enables 
gathering data from a well-defined population of comparable individuals in multiple industries 
(Eesley, 2011). The alumni survey increases the response rate and trust in the survey for the 
respondents. By surveying all alumni, we have polled all who could have founded a firm within 
this population. Due to these advantages, the use of alumni surveys as a data collection 
methodology has been growing, especially in the domain of entrepreneurship research (Burt, 
2001; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Hsu, Roberts, and Eesley, 2007; Lazear, 2004; Lerner and 
Malmendier, 2011).  
The 2001 survey generated 43,668 responses from MIT alumni for a 41.2 percent 
response rate. Out of 7,798 alumni who had indicated that they had founded a company, 2,111 
founders completed more detailed surveys in 2003, representing a response rate of 25.6 percent. 
Removing duplicates where more than one cofounder reported on the same firm brings us to a 
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total sample of 2,067 companies. We are able to compare data on demographic and educational 
characteristics of the entire population of alumni with the survey respondents. Differences in 
means tests of observed characteristics of the responders and non-responders of both the 2001 
and 2003 surveys detect little difference between the groups.4  
The data were matched with complementary data sources through 2006 via Compustat 
(for public companies), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and Dun & 
Bradstreet (for private companies). Industries covered in the sample include aerospace, 
architecture, biomedical, chemicals, consumer products, consulting, electronics, energy, finance, 
law, machine tools, publishing, software, telecommunications, other services, as well as other 
manufacturing. A key feature of this dataset is its scope of coverage: all living MIT alumni who 
graduated between 1930 to 2001 were surveyed.5 
Dependent Variables 
Following many studies in the literature, we measure entrepreneurial success through 
observed IPO or acquisition liquidity events. We define a favorable exit as either an IPO or an 
acquisition if that acquisition met either of two criteria: it made money for the investors (the 
valuation was higher than the capital raised) or if the acquired firm was older than five years and 
had positive (greater than zero) revenues. This measure eliminates acquisitions where the firm 
was acquired at a low valuation, was not generating positive cash flow and would have otherwise 
gone out of business. Arora and Nandkumar (2011) recently used similar screening criteria to 
measure favorable exits. The acquisition and IPO events were self-reports in the MIT survey. We 
confirmed their accuracy with the Compustat and the SDC Platinum databases. We also tested 
                                                
4 In only a few instances do the differences between the sub-samples vary by three percentage points or more. For 
the 2001 survey, only the variables male, European citizen, and Middle Eastern citizen meet these criteria.  
5 Respondents also reported on firms that later failed as well (41 percent of the firms failed), so the data include 
failed founding attempts.  
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the results for robustness by using alternative performance measure, exits, which equals 1 if the 
firm experienced any type of acquisition or IPO and 0 if not (as of 2003). The youngest firms 
would not have had sufficient time to have an IPO or acquisition so we restricted the analysis to 
firms founded in 1998 and earlier, giving the firms at least five years of operating time. 
Independent Variables 
Team characteristics. We measure diverse teams by the different functional roles on the 
founding team with the variable diverse team. The survey asked respondents for the role at 
founding for himself or herself and for each cofounder. These roles were then coded according to 
whether they fell under technology roles (CTO, Chief Scientist, etc.), finance, sales and 
marketing, or other. The number of roles thus ranges from 1 to 4. A diverse team is coded as a 
count of the number of functional roles on the founding team. Beckman and Burton (2008) 
similarly use the count of the number of functional roles on the founding team. We test for, and 
find, robustness to variants of this measure such as dichotomizing the variable split at the median 
of the underlying functional role count. As a measure of how technology-focused the founding 
team is, we created the variable technically focused team as a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if 
the founding team was entirely composed of individuals who indicated that their role at founding 
was focused on the development of the technology (as opposed to other roles including 
marketing, sales, finance, management, etc.). 
Innovation. We measure firms’ innovation strategy by creating a composite index of the 
extent to which a firm innovates as the basis of its strategy. The variable innovator ranges from 0 
to 3 depending on how innovative the firm is. A firm receives a three if it indicated that 
innovation was critical for its success, if it held at least one patent at the time of the survey, and 
if the idea for the venture came from a research lab (corporate or university). The firm receives a 
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2 if two of these conditions hold, a 1 if only one of them holds, and a 0 if none of them holds. 
Compared with prior studies that use patent counts as a measure of innovation, this measure has 
the advantage of applying to both younger and older firms (younger firms often have fewer 
resources to file for patents). The measure also has the advantage of being able to be used across 
industries, including those industries where patenting may not be used as frequently since it is 
less effective (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). As a robustness check, we examine the results 
using the components of the innovator index and by using the average patent “originality” score 
for a firm’s patents. The originality measure, a common one in the innovation literature, is a 
concentration index of the diversity of patent classes that a focal patent cites, with a patent citing 
a more diverse set of patent classes said to be more original (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001).  
Commercialization environment. We follow Gans and Stern (2003) in contrasting two 
startup commercialization environments, which depend on the extent to which existing 
complementary assets are made obsolete by innovation and the appropriability regime 
surrounding innovation. Teece (1986) defines complementary assets as the assets or capabilities 
of firms that assist in the commercialization of innovations.6 These assets can be resources that 
firms own, such as brand reputation, distribution channels, or customer relationships. They can 
also be organizational competencies, such as manufacturing capabilities, sales and service 
expertise, or the ability to capture customer knowledge. When intellectual property rights (IPR) 
are strong, innovation is more valuable due to the reduction of potential opportunism or 
expropriation (Anton and Yao, 1995; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Gans et al., 2002). 
Startups have less fear of disclosing their IP when forming an alliance or partnership in this case 
(Katila, et al., 2008). Formal intellectual property rights are one of several channels innovators 
                                                
6 Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994) describe a similar idea using the term “value network” to describe the system 
of producers and markets serving “the ultimate user of the products or services to which a given innovation 
contributes.” 
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can use to capture the value of their innovations. IPR may be particularly important in some 
industries in reducing the risks of expropriation (since patent protection varies by industry 
(Cohen et al., 2000)), thereby easing innovator contracting and knowledge disclosure.  
We define an environment where competitive commercialization is more frequently used 
as one in which the patent channel of appropriability is relatively weak while at the same time, 
incumbents’ extant complementary assets for commercialization are largely disrupted (startup 
innovators fear bargaining with industry incumbents for fear of expropriation at the same time as 
the cost of entry is relatively low). A cooperative commercialization environment is defined in 
the opposite way, where patent protection is effective and the importance of incumbents’ existing 
complementary assets is sustained (and so startup innovators feel more comfortable bargaining 
with incumbents, who have a comparative advantage in assembled complementary assets).  
We measure the importance of complementary assets and the effectiveness of patent 
protection in a firm’s industry by matching the industry sectors with the Carnegie Mellon 
industry R&D survey (Cohen, et al., 2000). We create the measure of industry complementary 
asset importance by averaging the importance of complementary manufacturing and sales or 
services (then we took the natural log to account for the skewed distribution). Sectors scoring 
high on this measure included electronics, telecommunication, machinery, chemicals and 
materials, biotechnology, medical devices and consumer products (scoring low were software, 
finance, and services).7 Similarly, we created an average of the importance of patents for 
protecting products and processes (and took the natural log to adjust for the skewed distribution) 
                                                
7 Not all MIT alumni firms fit into the industries in the CMU data (restaurants, dry cleaners, etc. are fairly rare). 
However, there are a number of services firms, such as consulting, law, accounting, and so on. These were grouped 
into an “other services” category. The results are robust to excluding these firms. Patents are very unlikely to be 
effective in the case of services firms; similarly, specialized complementary assets are likely unimportant. Thus, 
both of these measures are likely to be low. We therefore used the lowest values from the CMU survey for this 
category, which places them on similar footing as the printing and publishing industries, for example. 
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to create the measure of patent strength. Sectors high in patent strength included energy, electric 
utilities, aerospace, chemicals, materials, machinery, biotechnology and medical devices (scoring 
low were finance, software, and services). We use the median values of these measures as the 
cutoff point. We use the median of the ratings on the importance of complementary assets in the 
sector, complementary assets, and the effectiveness of patent protection, IPR strength, to split the 
sample into firms that are in an environment where complementary assets are important and 
patent protection is strong (499 firms) and an environment where complementary assets are less 
important and patent protection is weak (885 firms).8 
Control variables. Another aspect of the environment that is likely to shape the 
characteristics of the founding team is the economic cycle, in particular whether the firm was 
founded in a recession. General economic conditions at the time of founding were classified into 
expansion or contraction (recession) via the widely used National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee’s classifications (Stock and Watson, 2010). The 
variable recession year is equal to 1 if the firm was founded during a recession. We include this 
variable to proxy for founding conditions, as the prior literature suggests that founding in growth 
markets or high demand increases performance (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; Romanelli, 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).  
The prior literature also shows that firm performance is partly related to industry factors, 
so we use a set of industry dummies as controls for the industry segment (such as biotech, 
software, and electronics). Survey respondents chose the industry category that best fit their firm.  
Since prior work finds that entrepreneurial performance is related to the founder’s 
education level (Roberts, 1991), we control for the education level with master’s degree and 
                                                
8 Grouping industries based on their complementary assets and patent protection dimensions is a method grounded 
in the prior literature, and allows future researchers to classify new industries based on these characteristics.  
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doctorate degree controls. While having a founder with a doctorate degree might be an 
indication of a technology-focused team, not all doctorates in the sample are in technical fields, 
so we prefer the founding role measure and leave educational degrees as a control. Since more 
general experience may increase entrepreneurial performance, we control for founder age (Evans 
and Leighton, 1989). The variable founder age is the entrepreneur’s age when the firm was 
founded. A number of studies show that the founder’s prior industry experience increases firm 
performance (Klepper and Simons, 2000; Klepper, 2002; Ingram and Baum, 1997). Older, more 
experienced TMT members are found to aid firm performance. For example, CEOs in the 
microcomputer industry with an older experienced counselor make faster decisions, improving 
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). We also measure experience in founding a firm with the 
variable experienced entrepreneur as a binary variable indicating whether the founder has prior 
entrepreneurial experience. Prior work has shown experienced entrepreneurial founders 
outperform their less experienced counterparts (Delmar and Shane, 2006). 
Finally, we control for other team and firm-level effects that may influence firm 
performance. Since larger founding teams have been shown to outperform, we control for 
founding team size (in addition to the respondent) since having multiple members of a team leads 
to higher performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Roberts, 1991). We control for solo 
founder, which is equal to 1 if there was only one founder. Older firms tend to be larger and have 
higher revenues, so we control for the age of the startup, as measured by firm age. Since raising 
funding from external investors has been shown to be associated with higher firm performance 
and also may be easier for an experienced entrepreneur, we seek to control for these effects 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2007). External funding is equal to 1 if the individual raised 
funds from venture capital firms or angel investors. It is possible that some ventures had more 
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technical development prior to the founding of the company than others, allowing some to be 
ready for commercial sales, while others needed more technical development first. We therefore 
use a question from the survey about whether the founder had funding to develop a prototype 
prior to founding the company as another control variable (prototype funded). 
Analysis and Results 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and a pair-wise correlation table.9 Table 2 reports 
the results of the logit regressions predicting favorable exits. Table 2, model 2-1 shows results 
for the controls and model 2-2 shows just the main effects where diverse team is positive and 
significant (p<0.05) and tech. focused team is also positive and significant (p<0.10). Models 2-3 
and 2-4 test the effects of the interaction between team composition and the innovator strategy. 
Hypothesis 1a was that diverse founding teams are positively associated with venture 
performance, but are less beneficial when pursuing an innovator strategy. Model 2-3 provides 
evidence supporting H1a. We find a positive (above 1) odds ratio on diverse team, indicating that 
these teams in general have a positive effect, and we find a negative (below 1) odds ratio on the 
interaction term between innovator and diverse team, indicating that diverse teams are 
significantly less beneficial when innovating. We find a positive odds ratio in model 2-4 when 
interacting innovator and technically focused team, supporting hypothesis 1b that when using an 
innovation strategy, technically-focused teams are positively associated with performance.  
                                                
9 A majority (64 percent) of the firms have no founder in a technical role. Of the firms with no technical cofounders, 
67 percent of them are solo founders. Of these, most are in service industries (law, consulting, management). We 
examined the types of degrees earned by those who indicated that they did not have a technical role on the founding 
team and found 61.5 percent had engineering degrees, 15.5 percent had science degrees, 13.9 percent had 
management degrees, 4.8 percent had humanities and social sciences degrees and 4.3 percent had architecture 
degrees. Some of these individuals had been inventors and worked in technical roles in the past, but may have 
moved into management roles (29 percent indicated that in their prior work experience, they had created patented 
inventions). 
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Hypothesis 2a predicted that, when in a competitive commercialization environment, 
diverse founding teams would be positively associated with venture performance. In Table 3, 
models 3-1 and 3-2 report results for only the controls in the competitive and cooperative 
strategy settings, respectively. We find support for the hypothesis in the significant, positive odds 
ratio on diverse team in the competitive strategy environment (model 3-3). The odds ratio is 
significantly (p<0.05) larger than in the cooperative strategy setting. Hypothesis 2b predicted that 
technically-focused teams would be positively associated with venture performance when in a 
cooperative commercialization environment. This hypothesis was supported, as the odds ratio on 
technically focused team is positive and significantly larger (p<0.05) than the same odds ratio in 
the cooperative environment setting (model 3-6).10 
In the logit regression tables, we present odds ratios, which give a sense of the size of the 
effects. However, while odds ratios are good at showing differences in the effects across groups, 
they do not adequately take into account the baseline main effects. Marginal effects take into 
account the baseline risk of a favorable exit and more accurately reflect the impact of a change in 
team composition. Based on model 2-2 (Table 2), at the mean level of the other independent 
variables, we find the following marginal effects: for one additional functional role on the 
founding team, the main effect is an 8.9 percent higher likelihood of a favorable exit. Based on 
the specification in model 2-4, when employing an innovation strategy, a technically focused 
team results in a 3.7 percent greater likelihood of a favorable exit (this estimate is the total effect, 
including the main and interaction effects). Hall and Woodward (2010) show that the mean 
return on a VC exit to the investors is $5M ($9M for the entrepreneurs), so this estimate would 
represent an increase in expected value of $185,000 for the VCs ($333,000 for the 
                                                
10 Substituting an analysis with interaction terms instead of a split sample yields similar results. We present split 
sample analyses, as this allows the coefficients on the control variables to vary. 
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entrepreneurs). These results have significant real world effects and a magnitude that would 
likely justify the costs of a headhunting firm or other efforts to recruit the right cofounder. With 
interaction effects in non-linear models, graphing the interaction effect is necessary because the 
marginal effect is not equal to just changing the interaction term and depends on the levels of 
other variables (Norton, Ai and Wang, 2004). When we graph the interaction effect, we find an 
inverse U-shaped relationship (for the innovation and technically focused founding team 
interaction) with the strongest positive effect at seven percent greater likelihood for those at a 
moderate likelihood of a favorable exit. An additional function on the founding team when 
adopting an innovation strategy reduces the likelihood of a favorable exit by 8.4 percent (based 
on the specification in model (2-3)). This effectively cancels out the positive, beneficial effect of 
an additional function on the founding team in general. Graphing the interaction effect, we see 
that there is a U-shaped relationship, where the effect ranges from 2-4 percent lower likelihood at 
very low or very high probabilities of a favorable exit to 12 percent lower likelihood for those at 
a moderate likelihood of favorable exit. Finally, based on Table 3, model 3-6, in the cooperative 
environment a technically-focused founding team has a 12.8 percent greater likelihood of a 
favorable exit. In the competitive environment, based on model 3-3, an additional function on the 
founding team results in a 7.9% increase in the likelihood of a favorable exit. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Additional Analysis, Robustness and Limitations 
We ran additional analyses with variants of the dependent variable, independent 
variables, industry environment, and other periods of time to investigate the robustness of the 
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results.11 The results are robust to using exit as a measure indicating whether the firm 
experienced any acquisition or IPO event instead of favorable exit. We also tested for and found 
that the results are not sensitive to alternative measures of our key independent variables. We 
narrowed the sample to those firms with patents so that we can test the impact of patent-based 
measures of the degree of innovation (patent originality) and found the results robust. The results 
(available from the authors) are also not sensitive to using patents and the percentage of revenues 
spent on R&D as alternative innovation measures. We find the results robust to using a binary 
variant of the variable diverse team equal to 1 if the team has greater than the median number of 
structural roles on the founding team as an alternative to the continuous diverse team variable. 
Furthermore, defining the industry environments in alternative ways does not alter the 
results. While we decided to use the median values of complementary assets and patent 
protection, the results were robust to changing the exact division points across these 
environments and to simply defining them based on industries.12 We also found that our results 
hold across a broad range of different time periods (either restricting the data to more recently 
founded firms or to just firms founded before a certain year to test whether right censoring was 
driving our results). 
We next assessed whether our results are driven by the possible co-determination of 
founding team composition and business environment and strategy. Prior literature suggests that 
many studies in the management and organizations literature have concluded that team formation 
considerations precede strategy formulation. In this spirit, Beckman (2006) writes (p. 742): 
                                                
11 In response to a reviewer request about how the combination of innovation strategy, commercialization 
environment and team composition align, we ran three-way interactions. The prediction was that an innovation 
strategy in the cooperative environment with a technically-focused founding team would be best. The three way 
interactions suggest higher performance by technically-focused, innovation strategy firms in the cooperative 
environment and by diverse, innovation strategy teams in the competitive environment. 
12 Biotechnology, machine tools, chemicals and telecommunications make up the majority of cooperative 
environment firms and electronics and software firms make up the majority of the competitive environment firms. 
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“Indeed, prior work on new ventures has shown that founders and founding teams shape a firm’s 
initial strategies, structures, actions, and performance (e.g., Beckman, 2006; Boeker, 1988; 
Burton, Sorenson, and Beckman, 2002; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Gompers, Lerner, 
and Scharfstein, 2005; Roure and Maidique, 1986).” Ruef and colleagues (2003: p. 754) interpret 
their findings as indicating, “founding teams are generally formed for reasons of social 
convenience, and not strategy.”  
Nonetheless, since team formation may be an endogenous process alongside the choice of 
innovation strategy and commercialization environment (particularly for more savvy 
entrepreneurs), we use subsample analyses and an instrumental variables approach as robustness 
checks. We use two different sub-samples in Table 4, panels B and C (young founders and 
“naïve” teams) where the teams would plausibly be formed less for strategic reasons and are 
more likely formed based on social convenience. We use a subsample of first-time founders who 
are young (under the age of 28). For naïve teams, we use teams where the founders indicated 
they met via family, socially, in school, or in the research lab. In Table 4, panel A, we use an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach with an IV probit estimation procedure, as a Hausman test 
shows that the founding team variables may potentially be endogenous. Using these three 
analyses, we find results consistent with our main results.  
To conduct our IV analysis, we ran the first-stage as a probit regression on the potentially 
endogenous variables, technically focused and diverse team. We constructed the instrument idea 
from research (for technically focused teams) and team from work (used for diverse teams) 
where these variables indicate the primary source of the idea and founding team. These 
instruments are used separately in the regressions and are significantly correlated with the 
founding team composition, but should not be correlated with the error term through omitted 
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variables. The instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction because the source of the idea or team 
(research or work) should not have a direct impact on the likelihood of a favorable exit (venture 
execution rather than strict venture genesis is more likely to determine ultimate enterprise 
outcomes). We then assessed the instrument’s relevance. Using an F-test where the first stage 
model is compared to a model without the instrument, we find that the F-statistic is greater than 
the recommended values, suggesting that the instruments are not weak.13 The results in Table 4 
are consistent with our main Tables 2 and 3, providing greater confidence in our findings. In 
Table 4, Panel A, in our IV estimates, it is worth noting that tech. focused team becomes 
significant in the competitive environment as well as the cooperative environment. This does not 
occur in Panels B and C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our main findings are that technically-focused teams are aligned with a cooperative 
commercialization environment and when using an innovation strategy, while diverse teams are 
higher performing in a competitive commercialization environment. These results have 
implications for the related literatures on entrepreneurship, top management teams, and strategy.  
Prior work has examined factors such as the career history of founders and top 
management team, strategy and market growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). This 
literature has generally argued that a functionally diverse founding team is optimal (Beckman, et 
                                                
13 We also assess the instruments’ exogeneity using the over-identification J-test. Including all of the team sources 
from the survey, including team from social, team from school, and team met via family, the test fails to reject the 
null that the instrument is valid. This test assesses whether the bundle of instruments is exogenous assuming that a 
least one of the instruments is exogenous. These additional instruments are not used in the IV regression since they 
are weak instruments, however they allow us to perform the J-test for over-identification to test the exclusion 
restriction. 
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al., 2007).14 In addition, the prior literature shows that the general complexity surrounding the 
organization is an important factor in top management team composition (Priem, 1990). We 
provide theory and evidence that in some cases, a diverse team is less beneficial and a more 
technically-focused founding team does better. In these cases, when using an innovator strategy 
or in a cooperative industry environment, the complexity regarding technical issues is high while 
business model complexity is relatively lower. Our results show that the source of the 
complexity has implications for the type of top management team associated with higher 
performance. As a result, our work responds to Hambrick’s (2007) call to examine the role of the 
founding team as well as calls for work on moderating influences (Certo et al., 2006) by showing 
that the characteristics of highly performing founding teams may be contingent on their 
alignment with two factors – innovation strategy and industry commercialization environment. 
We also contribute to the debate between lifecycle and imprinting models of founding 
teams. Lifecycle models have argued that ventures can add the appropriate skills and top 
managers as they are needed over time (Greiner, 1972; Audia and Rider, 2005). Those models 
assert that a venture becomes “professionalized” over time and so a fit between the founding 
team and the eventual innovation strategy is unnecessary as the right skills can be added at a later 
stage (Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Keck, 1997; Randel and Jaussi, 2003). In contrast, imprinting 
models argue that the founding team composition has lasting influences on the firm (Beckman 
and Burton, 2008; Burton and Beckman, 2007). We contribute to this literature by showing that 
                                                
14 We do not regard our results as at odds with the results of Beckman (2006), which finds that diverse teams are 
more likely to undertake exploratory innovation. That study examines diverse teams in terms of prior employer 
affiliations, whereas we examine diverse teams by functional roles. The Beckman study examines the extent to 
which firms pursue an exploratory versus exploitative innovation strategy rather than their success in innovating or 
the firm’s likelihood of an exit. Beckman (2006) does examine firm growth as an outcome measure, but finds that 
exploratory innovation has a negative and insignificant effect on firm growth. While a diverse team (in terms of 
prior employer affiliations) may be more likely to pursue an exploratory innovation strategy, our results show that 
they will be more likely to have a favorable exit if they operate in a competitive environment and that they will have 
lower performance if they attempt to adopt an innovation strategy in a cooperative environment. 
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the initial founding team must be aligned with the strategy and environment to produce long-
term organizational performance, which may limit the effectiveness of sequential TMT 
professionalization over the venture life cycle. 
Finally, while the firm’s business environment continues to interest strategy and 
organization theorists (Porter, 1991; Selznick, 1949; Starbuck, 1983; Stinchcombe, 1965), little 
or no prior work has related firms’ commercialization environments to their founding team 
composition. While the prior literature studies new ventures’ entry strategies and finds that such 
strategies are contingent on the business environment (Teece, 1986; Gans, et al., 2002), we 
suggest that the commercialization environment is an important contingency in the relationship 
between founding team composition (and the associated information and skills of the startup) 
and organizational performance. Consequently, our findings contribute to the literature by 
showing how technical aspects of the industry commercialization environment influence 
founding team composition.  
Limitations and future research. One limitation of our research is that we cannot 
observe the precise ordering of who joined the founding team in relation to the timing of strategy 
and entry decisions. However, in keeping with the commercialization environment literature, we 
have conceptualized our analysis statically. A question for future research is: under what 
circumstances would a more dynamic conceptualization of changes in strategy or environment 
result in different implications for team composition? Another limitation is that we have not 
explicitly examined the costs of searching for teammates. Finally, another area for future 
research is in conceptualizing the skills and information available beyond the founding team to 
the broader set of resource providers (i.e., investors, early employees and advisors). An open 
question is whether these resource providers bring some of the same benefits to the venture. 
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While these and other future research directions would be interesting, our results here aid 
existing efforts to better understand when certain organizational structures, including founding 
team composition, might be aligned with firms’ strategy and business environment. Our work is 
among the first to suggest that entrepreneurs may need to take into account likely future strategic 
commercialization choices and environments when forming their founding team. 
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Table 1: Variables, Descriptive Statistics, and Correlations 
  Obs Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Favorable exit  1809 0.226 0.419 0 1 1.000       
2 Diverse team 1809 1.261 0. 521 1 4 0.164 1.000      
3 Tech. focused team 1809 0.165 0.371 0 1 0.144 -0.195 1.000     
4 Recession year 1552 0.731 0.915 0 3 0.109 0.024 0.007 1.000    
5 Innovator 1809 0.224 0.417 0 1 0.278 0.262 0.198 0.028 1.000   
6 Master’s degree 1520 0.263 0.440 0 1 0.042 0.063 0.009 -0.023 0.133 1.000  
7 Doctorate degree 1809 0.427 0.495 0 1 0.029 0.016 0.001 -0.027 0.073 -0.034 1.000 
8 Experienced entrep. 1809 0.163 0.369 0 1 0.145 0.022 0.045 -0.001 0.088 -0.088 0.022 
9 Founder age 1501 38.264 10.375 18 83 -0.097 -0.060 -0.032 0.008 -0.083 -0.049 0.021 
10 Firm age 1127 13.268 9.852 1 71 0.252 0.074 -0.011 0.299 0.057 -0.039 -0.048 
11 Ext funding 1771 0.427 0.495 0 1 0.283 0.201 0.152 -0.097 0.503 0.042 -0.009 
12 Founding team size 1764 1.218 1.346 1 4 0.274 0.535 0.198 0.017 0.398 0.026 0.010 
13 Solo founder 1764 0.391 0. 488 0 1 -0.192 -0.375 -0.380 -0.008 -0.268 0.067 0.053 
14 Prototype funded 1809 0.101 0.301 0 1 0.062 0.089 0.063 -0.068 0.304 0.086 0.016 
       7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
8 Experienced entrep.      1.000       
9 Founder age      0.259 1.000      
10 Firm age      -0.092 -0.088 1.000     
11 Ext. funding      0.185 -0.102 -0.128 1.000    
12 Founding team size      0.135 -0.128 0.032 0.374 1.000   
13 Solo founder      -0.118 0.072 -0.055 -0.300 -0.783 1.000  
14 Prototype funded      0.006 -0.111 -0.080 0.210 0.165 -0.125 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Logits of favorable exit for varied founding team structures under an innovator strategy (odds 
ratios using the entire sample are reported) 
 
VARIABLES 
 
(2-1) 
 
(2-2) 
 
(2-3) 
 
(2-4) 
Diverse team  1.417** 1.816***  
   (0.309)  (0.419)  
Tech. focused team  1.348*  0.899 
   (0.300)   (0.178) 
Innov x diverse team   0.604***  
    (0.089)  
Innov x tech focused team    1.337* 
     (0.207) 
Innovator  1.001 1.111 1.188* 0.953 
  (0.078)  (0.102)  (0.112)  (0.081) 
Recession year 1.782*** 1.220 1.808*** 1.766*** 
  (0.290)  (0.228)  (0.297)  (0.296) 
Master’s degree 0.838 1.021 0.869 0.990 
  (0.112)  (0.158)  (0.117)  (0.137) 
Doctorate degree 1.090 1.043 1.093 1.059 
  (0.197)  (0.230)  (0.202)  (0.204) 
Experienced entrep. 1.771*** 1.548** 1.700*** 2.072*** 
  (0.258)  (0.275)  (0.255)  (0.315) 
Founder age 1.000 1.006 1.000 0.999 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Firm age 1.040*** 0.996 1.040*** 1.038*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Ext. funding 1.646*** 1.498** 1.723*** 1.754*** 
  (0.271)  (0.275)  (0.277)  (0.299) 
Founding team size 1.122 1.051 1.134 1.101 
  (0.080)  (0.097)  (0.087)  (0.084) 
Solo founder 0.639** 0.735 0.693* 0.603** 
  (0.141)  (0.228)  (0.154)  (0.148) 
 Prototype funded 0.873 0.648* 0.862 0.858 
  (0.177)  (0.167)  (0.170)  (0.185) 
 Constant 0.215** 0.109*** 0.167*** 0.238** 
  (0.137)  (0.084)  (0.103)  (0.171) 
Industry F.E. Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1103 1103 1103 1103 
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.094 0.124 0.126 
Coefficients are odds ratios (numbers below one represent decreased odds). Robust, two-tailed standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Logits of favorable exit for varied founding team structures under different commercialization 
environment samples (odds ratios are reported) 
 
VARIABLES 
Competitive 
(3-1) 
Cooperative 
(3-2) 
Competitive 
(3-3) 
Cooperative 
(3-4) 
Competitive 
(3-5) 
Cooperative 
(3-6) 
Diverse team   1.759** 0.959   
    (0.465)  (0.240)   
Tech. focused team     1.175 1.760** 
     (0.271) (0.430) 
Innovator  1.576*** 0.897 1.523*** 0.894 1.089 0.855 
  (0.194)  (0.113)  (0.190)  (0.114)  (0.123)  (0.095) 
Recession year 0.604* 1.850** 0.634 1.855** 1.191 1.038 
  (0.181)  (0.466)  (0.193)  (0.468)  (0.276)  (0.233) 
Master’s degree 0.958 0.846 0.931 0.843 1.326 1.184 
  (0.218)  (0.174)  (0.212)  (0.174)  (0.256)  (0.206) 
Doctorate degree 0.553* 2.120*** 0.568 2.119*** 0.629* 1.423 
  (0.197)  (0.580)  (0.203)  (0.579)  (0.174)  (0.330) 
Experienced entrep. 1.872** 1.190 1.929*** 1.181 3.327*** 1.631** 
  (0.459)  (0.267)  (0.476)  (0.272)  (0.683)  (0.318) 
Founder age 1.002 0.995 1.001 0.995 0.981** 0.984 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Firm age 1.004 0.995 1.004 0.995 1.045*** 1.102*** 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
Ext. funding 1.101 2.597*** 1.081 2.593*** 1.672** 3.709*** 
  (0.280)  (0.701)  (0.273)  (0.700)  (0.361)  (0.810) 
Founding team size 1.072 1.258** 0.991 1.269** 1.028 1.333*** 
  (0.130)  (0.133)  (0.136)  (0.147)  (0.101)  (0.136) 
Solo founder 0.595 1.031 0.613 1.031 0.340*** 1.029 
  (0.234)  (0.367)  (0.245)  (0.367)  (0.110)  (0.320) 
Prototype funded 1.406 0.389*** 1.431 0.389*** 1.060 0.814 
  (0.509)  (0.129)  (0.526)  (0.130)  (0.330)  (0.231) 
Constant 0.120*** 0.206*** 0.125*** 0.208*** 0.245*** 0.0644*** 
  (0.064)  (0.122)  (0.066)  (0.123)  (0.124)  (0.035) 
Observations 581 554 581 554 581 554 
Pseudo-R2 0.081 0.075 0.067 0.081 0.075 0.081 
Coefficients are odds ratios (numbers below one represent decreased odds). Robust, two-tailed standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Instrumental variables probits and sub-sample logits of favorable exit for varied founding team structures 
under different estimation strategies 
Panel A: Instrumental 
Variables (IV probit) 
All 
(4-1) 
All 
(4-2) 
Competitive 
(4-3) 
Cooperative 
(4-4) 
Competitive 
(4-5) 
Cooperative 
(4-6) 
Diverse team  2.544***   2.357*** -1.975*** 
  (0.291)   (0.218) (0.091) 
Tech. focused team 0.096  1.942*** 2.333***   
 (0.124)  (0.443) (0.308)   
Innovator x diverse team  -1.457***     
  (0.144)     
Innovator x tech. focused team 0.101      
 (0.096)      
Obs. 1274 718 531 350 349 414 
Log-likelihood -957.595 -1108.705 -561.769 -385.838 -462.609 -401.807 
Panel B: Under 28 years old 
and first time founder   
Diverse team  3.864***   0.569* -3.727* 
  (1.418)   (0.337) (2.060) 
Tech. focused team -1.621*  0.102 3.175***   
 (0.975)  (0.415) (1.184)   
Innovator x diverse team  -0.742     
  (0.596)     
Innovator x tech. focused team 0.970**      
 (0.437)      
Observations 135 131 73 191 81 234 
Pseudo R2 0.116 0.108 0.199 0.145 0.269 0.094 
Panel C: Naïve teams   
Diverse team  2.155***   1.571* 0.149 
  (0.678)   (0.810) (0.759) 
Tech. focused team -0.736  0.768 3.019*   
 (0.792)  (0.801) (1.769)   
Innovator x diverse team  -1.997***     
  (0.583)     
Innovator x tech. focused team 1.467**      
 (0.722)      
Observations 123 123 74 69 74 69 
Pseudo R2 0.275 0.346 0.352 0.193 0.287 0.247 
Robust, two-tailed standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Controls are the same as in Tables 3 and 4 but are not shown to save 
space. We use two different sub-samples in Panels B and C (young founders and naïve teams) where the teams would plausibly be formed less for 
strategic reasons and are more likely formed based on social convenience. In Panel B, we use a subsample of first-time founders who are young (under the 
age of 28). For naïve teams in Panel C, we use teams where the founders indicated they met via family, socially, in school, or in the research lab. In Panel 
A, we report instrumental variables (IV) regressions. For the technically-focused team variable, we use idea from research lab as an instrument, and all R2 
statistics are relatively high, indicating there is not a weak instrument problem. The F statistic is 8.66, which exceeds the critical value of 6.66 of a weak 
instrument. For the diverse team variable, we use team from industry as an instrument. All the R2 statistics are relatively high, so they do not imply a 
weak-instrument problem. The F statistic is 3.31. If we are willing to accept at most a rejection rate of 15% of a nominal 5% Wald test, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are weak, since the test statistic of 3.31 exceeds its critical value of 2.84.  
